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NOTE
COUNSEL'S CONTROL OVER THE PRESENTATION
OF MITIGATING EVIDENCE DURING
CAPITAL SENTENCING
James Michael Blakemore*
The Sixth Amendment gives a defendant the right to control his defense
and the right to a lawyer's assistance. A lawyer's assistance, however,
sometimes interferes with a defendant's control over his case. As a result,
the Supreme Court, over time, has had to delineate the spheres of authority
that pertain to counsel and defendant respectively. The Court has not yet
decisively assigned control over mitigating evidence to either counsel or
defendant. This Note argues that counsel should control the presentation of
mitigating evidence during capital sentencing. First, and most importantly,
decisions concerning the presentation of mitigating evidence are best
characterized as strategic, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel allo-
cates strategic decisions to attorneys. Second, the criminal justice system's
need for reliable and legitimate outcomes-a need that reaches its zenith
during capital sentencing--outweighs a capital defendant's limited claims
to autonomy.
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INTRODUCTION
A guilty verdict changes the rules in a capital trial. Once a court has
found a capital defendant guilty, it turns to the question of his' sentence, and
the trial changes form. Floyd Maestas's trial was no different. After a jury
found him guilty of aggravated murder in the strangling, stabbing, and
stomping death of a seventy-two-year-old woman, as well as the aggravated
burglary of an eighty-seven-year-old woman whom he punched in the face,2
the proceedings shifted to the penalty phase to decide whether to put Maes-
tas to death.3 The shift brought with it a new array of prosecutorial
possibilities. Because the rules of evidence and the Confrontation Clause
often do not apply at capital sentencing,4 evidence relating to Maestas's crim-
inal record and criminal propensities, which would have been inadmissible at
trial, was presented to the jury.5 The State likewise presented evidence of
Maestas's prior crimes that the judge had found too "weak" to admit at trial
under the normal rules of evidence.6 Because the Supreme Court condones
the use of victim-impact evidence to balance the presentation of mitigating
evidence,7 the murder victim's granddaughter testified, recounting how,
I. Because inmates on death row are overwhelmingly male, see CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROJECT, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH Row U.S.A., WINTER 2012, at 1
(2012), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/DRUSAWinter_2012.pdf, I
have chosen to use masculine pronouns when speaking of criminal defendants or appellants
facing the death penalty.
2. State v. Maestas, No. 20080508, 2012 WL 3176383, 4-6 (Utah July 27, 2012);
Brief of Appellee at 9-10, Maestas, 2012 WL 3176383 (No. 20080508-SC).
3. Maestas, 2012 WL 3176383, 24.
4. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 1101 (d)(3) (stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence do
not apply to sentencing); see also John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment
Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1968 & n.7, 1969 (2005); infra Sec-
tion L.B (discussing split in Confrontation Clause cases).
5. Maestas, 2012 WL 3176383, I24-28, 296; Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 36,
Maestas, 2012 WL 3176383 (No. 20080508-SC).
6. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 5, at 35.
7. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). See generally Andrew Ash-
worth, Victim Impact Statements and Sentencing, 1993 CRIM. L. REV. 498. The Supreme Court
has defined "mitigating evidence" as "evidence which tends logically to prove or disprove
some fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating val-
ue." Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284 (2004) (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S.
433, 440 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[E]vidence about the defendant's back-
ground and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that
defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background...
may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510, 535 (2003) (alterations in original) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319
(1989)).
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lacking the money to hire help, she had been forced to clean up her grand-
mother's blood in the days after the murder.'
Maestas's counsel, however, did not present the majority of the mitigating
evidence that the victim-impact testimony was meant to balance. When Maes-
tas learned that his counsel planned to call a witness who would testify that
she had seen him at seven years old having sex with his fourteen-year-old sis-
ter, Maestas requested that his lawyers be removed and that no mitigating
evidence be presented.9 He claimed that the proposed testimony was false, and
he worried that it would damage his relationship with his family.10 The court
found that Maestas's waiver of counsel would not be constitutionally valid,
so rather than remove his lawyers, it ordered them to respect Maestas's deci-
sions concerning mitigating evidence.I1 As a result, not only did the jury not
hear of the sexual episode but it also did not learn that Maestas, at eight
years old, had seen the same sister stabbed to death by her boyfriend.12
Moreover, the jury heard nothing of the older boy who sexually abused a
six-year-old Maestas or of Maestas's significant cognitive deficiencies. It
also heard very little about his childhood poverty.' 3 In essence, the jury
heard only aggravating evidence that would have been inadmissible at trial,
and then sentenced Maestas to death.
14
In at least one respect, Maestas's story is not unusual. Capital defendants
often object to the presentation of traumatizing or embarrassing mitigating
evidence.' 5 It remains unsettled, however, whether courts should sustain
these objections.' 6
This Note argues that a capital defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
control his trial does not extend to strategic decisions concerning the intro-
duction of mitigating evidence during capital sentencing. Part I explains the
doctrine governing the division of decisionmaking power between defendant
8. Maestas, 2012 WL 3176383, 315; Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 5, at
39.
9. Maestas, 2012 WL 3176383, 1 31-33; Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 5,
at 42-44.
10. Maestas, 2012 WL 3176383, 1[ 31-33; Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 5,
at 42.
It. Maestas, 2012 WL 3176383, 1 223-32; Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note
5, at 43.
12. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 5, at 42 n.7.
13. Id. at 43-44.
14. See id. at 18.
15. See Bradley A. MacLean, Effective Capital Defense Representation and the Diffi-
cult Client, 76 TENN. L. REV. 661, 670 (2009); The Supreme Court, 2006 Term-Leading
Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 185, 260 (2007) [hereinafter Ineffective Assistance] ("Defendants
may experience 'defensiveness, shame, [or] repression,' regarding episodes of abuse.... De-
fendants may also want to prevent certain ... individuals from testifying." (first alteration in
original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Alan M. Goldstein et al., Assessing Childhood Trauma
and Developmental Factors as Mitigation in Capital Cases, in FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH
ASSESSMENT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 365, 373 (Steven N. Sparta & Gerald P.
Koocher eds., 2006))).
16. See infra Part IH.
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and counsel at trial-a division that turns primarily on whether the decision
in question is fundamental or strategic. Part II argues that although the de-
fendant has a right to present mitigating evidence, it does not necessarily
follow that he has a right to prohibit his counsel from introducing mitigating
evidence. Part III argues that the decision to present mitigating evidence is
strategic, not fundamental, and as a result, the introduction of mitigating evi-
dence should be counsel's prerogative. Part IV considers and rebuts arguments
in favor of allowing a capital defendant to control the introduction of mitigat-
ing evidence, and it concludes that the State's interest in conducting just,
reliable, and efficient proceedings outweighs a convicted defendant's dimin-
ished interest in autonomy.
I. THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO CONTROL His CASE
The Sixth Amendment is structurally at odds with itself. It gives the de-
fendant the right both to control his defense and to have a lawyer's
assistance. But because the lawyer's assistance sometimes interferes with
the defendant's control, the Supreme Court has had to delineate each party's
sphere of authority. Gradually distinguishing between fundamental and stra-
tegic decisions, the Court has allocated control over the former to the
defendant and the latter to counsel. Such is the situation at trial, anyway.
During capital sentencing proceedings, however, the allocation of control is
less clear, as the Court has declined the wholesale application of Sixth
Amendment trial rights in those proceedings. Indeed, few trial rights survive
the transition to the penalty phase. The unequivocal survival of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel during this phase, however, suggests that stra-
tegic decisions during capital sentencing remain firmly in the lawyer's
province. Section I.A outlines the division of decisionmaking power the
Sixth Amendment mandates at trial, while Section I.B examines the extent
to which Sixth Amendment trial rights continue to apply during capital sen-
tencing.
A. The Division of Decisional Labor at Trial: Fundamental
Versus Strategic Choices
The right to represent oneself and the right to counsel sometimes con-
flict. The Constitution protects a defendant's choice to represent himself,
regardless of whether that choice is ultimately in his own interest. 7 It is the
defendant "who suffers the consequences if the defense fails," the Supreme
Court reasoned in Faretta v. California, and thus the law gives "[t]he fight to
defend ... directly to the accused."'8 Even as the Court delineated this right
to self-representation, however, it recognized the tension in the structure of
the Sixth Amendment between "the fight of an accused to conduct his own
17. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
18. Id. at 819-20; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1340 [Vol. I111: 1337
Counsel's Control
defense"' 9 and the requirement that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."20
This tension is particularly apparent in situations where a defendant
does not choose to represent himself. The Court, in recognizing the right to
self-representation, acknowledged that when the defendant is represented by
counsel, "law and tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to make
binding decisions of trial strategy in many areas."'" The law and tradition
that the Court references are significant: even before the Court recognized
the right to self-representation, it had differentiated between strategic or
tactical decisions and "personal choices," allocating the former to counsel
and reserving the latter exclusively for the defendant.2 The line between
strategic and personal decisions is not always clear, however, leaving courts
to analogize to existing precedent to determine which category decisions fall
into as they arise.23
When the Court first recognized the right to self-representation, anxiety
about its effect on the right to counsel quickly surfaced. Some argued that
Faretta had upset the case law's division of decisionmaking between coun-
sel and defendant.24 These scholars read Faretta as limiting an attorney's
previously broad authority, reducing it to " 'on-the-spot' decisions where
timing considerations precluded consultation with the defendant."
2 5
As time went on, however, the Court dispelled any doubt about the via-
bility of the distinction between attorney-controlled strategy and the
defendant's fundamental choices. In Jones v. Barnes, the Court made clear
that the defendant has the "ultimate authority" to decide "whether to plead
guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal."26
Due to their "fundamental" nature, these decisions are reserved for the de-
fendant.27 Conversely, strategic decisions that would benefit from the
"professional judgment" and "superior ability of trained counsel" are better
left to lawyers.2"
Today, a large number of decisions fall within counsel's broad sphere of
authority. Giving counsel control over the strategic elements of a trial, in the
words of the Court, "is a practical necessity," since the "adversary process
19. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
21. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820.
22. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.6(a) (5th ed. 2009); see also
Richard H. Chused, Faretta and the Personal Defense: The Role of a Represented Defendant in
Trial Tactics, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 636, 638-49 (1977).
23. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. For a list of decisions the Supreme
Court has thus far allocated to defendant and counsel respectively, see infra note 82.
24. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 22, § 11.6(a).
25. Id.; see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 759 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26. 463 U.S. at 751.




could not function effectively if every tactical decision required client ap-
proval. ' 29 As a result, so long as counsel has discharged her duties
effectively, the defendant cannot object to her decisions regarding how to
cross-examine, which witnesses to call, or whether to disclose witness iden-
tities before trial.3" Indeed, attorney control has continued to encroach on
the decisional territory of defendants: in 2004 the Supreme Court ruled that
a lawyer's decision to concede guilt during trial is not "the functional equiv-
alent of a guilty plea," and thus does not require explicit consent from the
defendant.3 Even having a strong resemblance to the type of personal, fun-
damental decisions traditionally left to the defendant-like guilty pleas-in
no way guarantees that a court will, in fact, deem a decision the defendant's
to make.
The Court has made clear that the right to self-representation is not ab-
solute, and a court must weigh a defendant's autonomy interest against the
State's countervailing interest in the integrity and efficiency of the proceed-
ings.32 A court must balance these interests not only at trial but on appeal as
well. Appellate proceedings, however, differ from trial proceedings in at
least two fundamental respects: First, because the Constitution does not give
defendants the right to an appeal, it necessarily cannot give them the right to
self-representation on appeal.33 Second, a court has found an appellate de-
fendant guilty, and thus an appellate defendant no longer retains the
presumption of innocence that accompanied him throughout trial.34 Due to
the latter difference, the Court found the defendant's autonomy interests
following a felony conviction "less compelling" than those undergirding the
right to self-representation at trial.35 At the same time, a felony conviction
does nothing to reduce the State's interest in fair and efficient proceedings.36
In short, on appeal "the balance.., surely tips in favor of the State."37
B. Sixth Amendment Rights During Capital Sentencing
That a guilty verdict changes a defendant's status may explain the differ-
ing levels of Sixth Amendment protection at trial and sentencing. In the
words of one commentator, the guilt and penalty phases are "separate uni-
29. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249 (2008); see also Florida v. Nixon, 543
U.S. 175, 187 (2004) (noting that the obligation "to consult with the client regarding 'im-
portant decisions' .... does not require counsel to obtain the defendant's consent to 'every
tactical decision'" (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), and Taylor v.
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988))).
30. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988).
31. Nixon, 543 U.S. at 188 (quoting Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618, 624 (Fla.
2000)).
32. Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 162-63 (2000).
33. Id. at 160.
34. Id. at 162.
35. Id. at 163.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 162.
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verses, governed by very different rules. 38 Indeed, the transition from trial
to sentencing, like the transition from trial to appellate proceedings, sees a
winnowing of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. To be sure, due pro-
cess applies to sentencing proceedings, but in so holding, the Supreme Court
simultaneously made clear that due process at sentencing does not entail
"the entire panoply of criminal trial procedural rights.
' 39
Rather than finding due process to require the wholesale application of
Sixth Amendment trial procedures to sentencing, the Court has taken a
piecemeal approach. 40 The Confrontation Clause, for example, floats in lim-
bo, as it remains unclear whether a defendant can exercise the right to
confrontation during the penalty phase.41 Other Sixth Amendment rights
evaporate completely once sentencing begins. Specifically, the right to a jury
of one's peers does not exist at sentencing.
42
Yet, in the face of this uncertainty, the Court has held one Sixth
Amendment right applicable to sentencing without hesitation: the right to
counsel.43 A criminal defendant enjoys the right to counsel at every proceed-
ing in which his "substantial rights" might be affected. 44 Due to its "critical
nature," the penalty phase undoubtedly qualifies. 45 Furthermore, the penalty
phase resembles the guilt phase enough to require essentially the same role
38. Douglass, supra note 4, at 1968.
39. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 & n.9 (1977).
40. Douglass, supra note 4, at 1969-70.
41. As a "general rule ... defendants have no confrontation right during sentencing."
United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1128 (C.D. Cal. 2006); see also United States v.
Littlesun, 444 E3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2006). In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949),
the Supreme Court declined to apply the Confrontation Clause to capital sentencing in particu-
lar, but Williams no longer clearly controls, United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 324 (4th Cir.
2003); compare Del Vecchio v. I1l. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1387-88 (7th Cir. 1994)
(holding that in a capital case there is no exception to the long sanctioned use of hearsay at
sentencing), and Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 939 (4th Cir. 1990), with Proffitt v.
Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1254-55 (11 th Cir. 1982) (finding that the Supreme Court's em-
phasis on the reliability of death sentences requires that the Confrontation Clause apply during
capital sentencing).
42. This is true even of capital sentencing. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459
(1984); see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that the Sixth Amend-
ment requires a jury, rather than a judge, to find only "enumerated aggravating factors [that]
operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense" (quoting Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n. 19 (2000))). But see Marc R. Shapiro, Note, Re-Evaluating
the Role of the Jury in Capital Cases After Ring v. Arizona, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L.
633, 633-34 (2004) (noting that Ring forced the revision of sentencing schemes in the small
number of states that have historically used judges to impose death sentences).
43. E.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984); Mempa v. Rhay, 389
U.S. 128, 137 (1967).




of counsel at both proceedings: "to ensure that the adversarial testing pro-
cess works to produce a just result."
4 6
The Court's piecemeal approach to adopting Sixth Amendment trial
rights at sentencing, then, has produced sentencing rights that are little more
than "shadows" of trial rights.4 7 In spite of the Court's reluctance to find
much of the Sixth Amendment applicable to the penalty phase of criminal
prosecutions, Sixth Amendment vestiges at sentencing have unequivocally,
and enduringly, included the right to counsel, as well as the concomitant
right to effective assistance. What the persistence of the right to counsel
means for the division of decisional labor between counsel and defendant at
sentencing, however, remains unclear.
II. DISTINGUISHING THE RIGHT TO PRESENT MITIGATING EVIDENCE
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on whose decision ultimately con-
trols the presentation of mitigating evidence in cases of disagreement
between defendant and counsel. Although the Court seemed to speak to the
issue in a recent decision, its holding indicates the unsettled state of the law
in this area. Section II.A examines the defendant's right to present mitigat-
ing evidence and concludes that the mere existence of the right does not
reveal who controls the presentation. Section II.B analyzes the most recent
Supreme Court case treating control over the presentation of mitigating evi-
dence and argues that its holding does not control the issue this Note
addresses.
A. The Right to Present Mitigating Evidence
The Court has consistently found that a capital defendant has the right to
present mitigating evidence and that, where the defendant has not at least
had the opportunity to present such evidence, the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibits imposing the death penalty.48 In Woodson v. North Carolina, the Court
46. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385-86 (2012) ("The precedents also estab-
lish that there exists a right to counsel during sentencing in both noncapital and capital cases."
(citations omitted)); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87.
47. Douglass, supra note 4, at 1968. But see Dale E. Ho, Silent at Sentencing: Waiver
Doctrine and a Capital Defendant's Right to Present Mitigating Evidence After Schriro v.
Landrigan, 62 FLA. L. REV. 721, 743 (2010) ("The sentencing proceeding in a capital case is,
in essence, a second trial .... The same rights and constitutional protections ... apply... ").
One might reconcile these two views by thinking of capital sentencing as a cross between trial
and sentencing, the trial portion consisting in a determination of whether the State has proven
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jules Epstein, Mandatory Mitigation: An
Eighth Amendment Mandate to Require Presentation of Mitigation Evidence, Even When the
Sentencing Trial Defendant Wishes to Die, 21 TMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1, 31 (2011).
48. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (stating that the Constitution
requires that a capital defendant be given "wide latitude" to present mitigating evidence);
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393 (2000) (noting the defendant's "undisputed" and "con-
stitutionally protected right ... to provide the jury with ... mitigating evidence"); Buchanan
v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1998); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989); Cali-
fornia v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-17
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found that the Constitution requires the opportunity to present mitigating
evidence to ensure that capital cases produce sentences that are both
reliable 49 and individualized.
50
The Court has emphasized the importance of presenting available miti-
gating evidence in the context of capital sentencing. Capital punishment is
"qualitatively different" from a prison term of any length, and thus it follows
that a court must give individualized consideration to each particular de-
fendant before it can impose a death sentence.5' The Constitution requires
that a sentencer be given the opportunity to balance aggravating factors
against mitigating evidence to ensure a reliable, individualized sentence in a
capital case. The failure to present mitigating evidence undermines this
"delicately balanced protection"52 in a manner that some would argue is un-
constitutional.53 A sentencer cannot, of course, consider evidence that has
not been presented, and a jury cannot properly assess the appropriateness of
a death sentence when no one is making the case for life.54 There can be
little doubt that death sentences imposed without the benefit of mitigating
evidence are both impersonal and unreliable.5
Nevertheless, despite its recognized importance to reliability and indi-
vidualization, current capital-sentencing jurisprudence does not require that
(1982); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976) (plurality opinion); cf Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (invalidating as unconsti-
tutional a statute that limited what types of mitigating evidence a defendant could present);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
49. 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (noting "the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case"). The Eighth
Amendment reserves the death penalty for "the worst of the worst," Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S.
163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting), and requires reliable sentencing procedures in order to
avoid "a substantial risk that the death penalty [will) be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 601 (plurality opinion) (alterations in original) (quoting Gregg,
428 U.S. at 188) (internal quotation marks omitted). A sentence is "reliable," then, when based
on a "consideration of the 'character and record of the individual offender and the circum-
stances of the particular offense.'" Id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
(1976)). Sentences rendered without adequate consideration of the individual being sentenced
are unreliable in that they leave room for doubt as to whether "death is the appropriate pun-
ishment in a specific case." Id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
51. Id. at 305.
52. Linda E. Carter, Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of
Court-Appointed Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Advocates
Death, 55 ThNN. L. REv. 95, 111 (1987).
53. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 47, at 19-20.
54. Anthony J. Casey, Maintaining the Integrity of Death: An Argument for Restricting
a Defendant's Right to Volunteer for Execution at Certain Stages in Capital Proceedings, 30
AM. J. CRIM. L. 75, 97 (2002).
55. Impersonal because they fail to respect the defendant's dignity by considering fully
his individual character and circumstances, see Ho, supra note 47, at 741, and unreliable be-
cause without such consideration one cannot be certain whether the offender qualifies as one
of the "worst of the worst," see id.; see also supra note 49.
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mitigating evidence be presented. 6 As a result, a defendant, or his lawyer, is
often free to forgo the presentation of mitigating evidence.17 But the fact that
a defendant or his lawyer can, with certain limitations, choose not to exer-
cise the defendant's right to present mitigating evidence does not reveal who
actually has the authority to make the decision.
Similarly, the fact that the Constitution protects the defendant's right to
present mitigating evidence provides little guidance as to whose decision it
is to present this evidence, as the Constitution can protect a defendant's right
without affirming his control over it. A defendant, for example, has the right
to a trial but when represented does not have the right to control every as-
pect of his case.58 He has the right, under the Sixth Amendment, to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, but his counsel ultimately de-
cides whether to cross-examine those witnesses.59 Even the decision to
concede guilt during the guilt phase of a capital trial does not require the
defendant's explicit consent.60 That the defendant enjoys a constitutional
right, then, does not necessarily mean that he controls the manner in which
it is exercised. A capital defendant has the constitutional right to contest the
appropriateness of a death sentence, but once he decides to do so he yields
control to counsel over the argument for life.
B. Schriro v. Landrigan: The Unresolved Issue of the Defendant's Control
over Mitigating Evidence
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken directly on whether the de-
fendant or his counsel ultimately controls the presentation of mitigating
evidence, it recently came close in Schriro v. Landrigan.1 In many respects,
the facts of Landrigan were similar to those of a line of Supreme Court cas-
es that overturned death sentences where defense counsel had failed to
investigate potential mitigating evidence adequately.62 At Landrigan's sen-
tencing hearing, his counsel presented no mitigating evidence whatsoever,
despite having prepared testimony from two witnesses, Landrigan's ex-wife
56. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 (2003).
57. See, e.g., Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 478 (2007) (finding not objectively
unreasonable a court's conclusion that a defendant's refusal to allow the presentation of any
mitigating evidence prevented him from later challenging his counsel's failure to investigate
such evidence further). But cf Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 392-93 (2005) (finding coun-
sel's investigation of mitigating evidence constitutionally inadequate); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at
533 (basing its holding on the principle that counsel's strategic decision to forgo presenting
mitigating evidence is reasonable only insofar as it is supported by sufficient investigation of
such evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (finding that defense counsel's
failure to investigate mitigating evidence adequately was not justified as a strategic decision).
58. See supra Section I.A.
59. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988).
60. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190-93 (2004).
61. 550 U.S. 465 (2007).
62. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 392; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533; Williams, 529 U.S. at 396.
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and his birth mother.63 More troubling still, this limited investigation had
failed to uncover a long list of the horrors typical of mitigation cases.' 4 In
his dissent, Justice Stevens emphasized that "[n]o one, not even the Court,
seriously contends that counsel's investigation of possible mitigating evi-
dence was constitutionally sufficient."65 In light of other factually similar
cases, then, Landrigan seemed poised to have his sentence overturned.
66
But Landrigan differed factually from similar cases in one significant
way: Landrigan instructed his lawyer not to present mitigating evidence.6
As a result, the Court held that where a defendant refuses to allow the
presentation of mitigating evidence, a court can reasonably conclude that the
same defendant cannot later base a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
on his counsel's failure to investigate mitigating evidence further.
68
Landrigan did not address whether the decision to present mitigating ev-
idence is fundamental or strategic. Though it allowed the defendant to derail
the presentation of evidence his counsel had prepared, his counsel did not
seek to present the evidence over his objections. That is, the Court did not
confront a situation in which defendant and counsel disagreed about the
presentation of mitigating evidence and thus did not have to decide whose
decision would ultimately control.
Landrigan is also distinguishable on procedural grounds. As a federal
habeas case, Landrigan was decided under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which restricts relief to decisions
that are based on an unreasonable determination of the facts or that are
"contrary to, or involve[] an unreasonable application of, clearly established
63. Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 469-70.
64. See id. at 483 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A serious organic brain disorder ... the
effects of [Landrigan's] birth mother's drinking and drug use during pregnancy.., a history of
[Landrigan's] troubled childhood with his adoptive family-a childhood marked by serious
substance abuse problems (including an overdose in his eighth or ninth grade classroom), a
stunted education, and recurrent placement in substance abuse rehabilitation facilities, a psy-
chiatric ward, and police custody.").
65. Id.
66. Ho, supra note 47, at 724.
67. Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 469; see Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377-80 (2005)
(defendant did not instruct counsel not to use mitigating evidence); Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510, 514-16 (2003) (same); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 369-72 (2000) (same).
This characterization of the facts is contested. Justice Stevens argued that "the Arizona post-
conviction court's determination that respondent 'instructed his attorney not to bring any
mitigation to the attention of the [sentencing] court' is plainly contradicted by the record."
Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 492 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Petition
for Writ of Certiorari app. F at F-I, Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (No. 05-1575)). The Court was
certainly guilty of misleadingly severing Landrigan's words from their context. Compare id. at
470 (majority opinion) (quoting Landrigan as saying, "I think if you want to give me the death
penalty, just bring it right on. I'm ready for it."), with State v. Landrigan, 859 P.2d 111, 117
(Ariz. 1993) (quoting Landrigan as saying, "This never happened. I think the whole thing
stinks. I think if you want to give me the death penalty, just bring it right on. I'm ready for it."
(emphasis added)).
68. Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 478.
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Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."69
Thus the Court asked not whether the state court's decision was incorrect
but whether it was unreasonable-a "substantially higher threshold."70 Fur-
thermore, Arizona's postconviction court could not have applied clearly
established federal law unreasonably because clearly established federal law
on the issue did not exist-indeed it could not exist, as the Supreme Court
"ha[d] never addressed a situation like this."'" In other words, the Court's
holding in Landrigan means only that the state court's ruling-that a capital
defendant can refuse to allow the introduction of mitigating evidence-is
reasonable, but not necessarily correct. And given the Court's procedural
posture, its holding could not clearly establish what before was indetermi-
nate.
Scholars have found Landrigan striking for the ease with which it al-
lowed a defendant to waive his right to present mitigating evidence.72 They
worry that, in spite of the extremely deferential AEDPA standard under
which the case was decided, lower courts will interpret the ruling as a guide
for mitigating evidence waiver cases.73 These commentators find this result
problematic not because they believe that mitigating evidence is not the de-
fendant's to waive but because they believe that it should not be waived so
easily.74 In general, Jules Epstein notes that this "literature has been disturb-
ingly silent on [Landrigan's] implications and correctness"; in particular,
Epstein singles out Dale E. Ho's "uncritical acceptance of a defendant's
right to waive mitigation" as especially troubling.75
If a court ultimately finds that a defendant controls the question, then the
arguments in favor of requiring that the defendant's waiver enjoy the same
safeguards as other trial rights of similar magnitude seem unquestionably
correct. This Note argues, however, that in cases like Maestas's or Landri-
gan's, the constitutionality of waivers of mitigating evidence should not
arise at all. A defendant cannot waive what he does not control. If counsel's
69. Id. at 472-73; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (2012).
70. Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473.
71. See id. at 478.
72. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 47, at 725; see also MacLean, supra note 15, at 670.
73. E.g., Ho, supra note 47, at 751 ("[T]he opinion in Landrigan creates a danger that
courts, when confronted with a defendant who opposes the introduction of certain types of
mitigating evidence, will find that the defendant has waived all mitigation."); see also Mac-
Lean, supra note 15, at 671. In Floyd Maestas's case, the Utah Supreme Court read Landrigan
as "impl[ying] that the represented defendant could waive th[e] right" to present mitigating
evidence. State v. Maestas, No. 20080508, 2012 WL 3176383, 241 (Utah July 27, 2012).
74. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 47, at 725 (arguing that a valid waiver should "require[] an
affirmative showing on the record that the defendant's choice is knowing, voluntary, and intel-
ligent"); see also MacLean, supra note 15, at 670-71.
75. Epstein, supra note 47, at 14. For Epstein, to allow a defendant to waive the presen-
tation of mitigating evidence is to violate the Constitution, since a sentence rendered without
consideration of mitigating evidence cannot be reliable and individualized in the manner man-
dated by Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 2-3. In other words, for Epstein, as for those
he criticizes, the correct answer to Landrigan would have had nothing to do with the Sixth
Amendment's allocation of control over mitigating evidence.
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strategic decisions concerning mitigation are conclusive, regardless of her
client's wishes, then a court will not have to consider the adequacy of a
waiver unless counsel and her client are in agreement. In other words, in
cases where counsel seeks to introduce mitigating evidence over her client's
objections, whether the defendant's attempted waiver is knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent will be irrelevant. Ultimately, the decision is not the defend-
ant's to make.
III. MITIGATING EVIDENCE AS A STRATEGIC DECISION
This Part argues that decisions about the presentation of mitigating evi-
dence-how much to present and what to exclude-are strategic. Like
strategic decisions during the guilt phase, these decisions benefit from the
detached judgment, superior ability, and professional training of lawyers.76
Drawing on experience, research, and the advice of colleagues to anticipate
the effect of evidence on the jury, selecting appropriate and important facts
from the welter of information available about the defendant's life, and
shaping those facts into a cogent narrative-such actions are fundamentally
strategic and thus pertain to the role of counsel.
The Court has yet to articulate a clear legal standard for determining
whether a decision is strategic or fundamental. In the context of control over
mitigating evidence, this omission has generated considerable debate. Crim-
inal law scholar Justin F. Marceau, for example, argues that the choice to
present or forgo the presentation of mitigating evidence is "unquestionably a
fundamental decision," and thus to be left to the defendant.77 Because miti-
gating evidence often involves tremendously personal and compromising
information, the claim holds intuitive appeal; it is due to this intuition that
few are surprised when defendants object to the presentation of mitigating
evidence.78 But to use "fundamental" in this way is to confuse the word's
ordinary meaning with its meaning as a term of art.79 More misleading still
is the alternative term "personal decision." 0 Mitigating evidence, so fre-
quently intimate in nature, is undoubtedly personal in the lay sense and
fundamental to the defendant, his life, and his self-conception. Yet it is not
the goal-oriented, black-and-white type of decision meant by the Court
when it uses the terms fundamental and personal.8
Since first announcing the difference between fundamental and strategic
decisions, the Supreme Court has continued, case by case, to divide the
76. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
77. Justin F. Marceau, Exploring the Intersection of Effectiveness & Autonomy in Capi-
tal Sentencing, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 183, 196 (2006).
78. Epstein, supra note 47, at 2 n.8 (quoting MacLean, supra note 15, at 670); Ho,
supra note 47, at 740.
79. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
80. Id.
81. See infra note 82.
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world of trial decisions between the two categories.82 Thus far, the decisions
the Court has found to be fundamental, and hence for the defendant to
make, include decisions like whether to plead guilty or to testify.83 These
types of decisions are simply different from the decision to present mitigat-
ing evidence. Decisions of the former type, though by no means
uncomplicated, require only that a defendant choose between two options;
the same cannot be said of a carefully crafted argument for life. Deciding to
plead guilty or to testify is complicated in the sense that it involves a diffi-
cult and personal decision-a decision based on intuition and gut feeling but
not training. Crafting an argument for life is complicated in a different way:
it involves many decisions that together form a broader strategy 84 and that
are of the kind the Court has judged best left to the training, professional
judgment, and superior ability of counsel.
85
To be sure, a court cannot abrogate a defendant's right to choose the
goals and objectives of litigation, even after a guilty verdict. 86 Thus, a de-
fendant must make the decision to pursue life or death, and where the
defendant chooses death, the presentation of mitigating evidence is not a
strategic decision. 87 But once a defendant has chosen to seek life, the task of
designing the strategy for achieving that goal falls to his attorney.
It is no answer to designate withholding mitigating evidence as a goal of
litigation-to say, "I choose to seek life without parole so long as I decide
what evidence the jury does and does not hear." A criminal defendant cannot
annex the exclusive province of counsel by conditioning his fundamental de-
cisions on strategic decisions. During the guilt phase, the defendant could not
gain control over a strategic decision, like the decision to call a particular wit-
ness or to forgo cross-examination, by subordinating that decision to and
subsuming it under a fundamental decision, like the decision to plead not
guilty. In other words, the defendant cannot say, "I choose to plead not guilty
82. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 22, § 11.6(a). So far, the Supreme Court has found the
fundamental-decisions category to include whether to plead guilty, waive the right to be pre-
sent at trial, testify on one's own behalf, and forgo an appeal. As for decisions controlled by
counsel, the Court has included in the strategic category the decision to challenge the prosecu-
tion's use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, wear civilian clothes at trial, challenge a
jury instruction, press a particular claim on appeal, forgo cross-examination, call a particular
witness, and provide discovery to the prosecution. Id.
83. Id.
84. Recall, for example, that pleading guilty is a personal, fundamental decision,
whereas conceding guilt as part of a trial strategy to avoid death is not. Florida v. Nixon, 543
U.S. 175, 187-93 (2004). The Court's distinction emphasizes the form of the decision over its
content when determining whether it is counsel's or defendant's to make.
85. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,751 (1983).
86. See Carter, supra note 52, at 146.
87. Id. The Constitution permits so-called "volunteers" to waive their right to appeal
and submit to the imposition of the death penalty. See generally John H. Blume, Essay, Killing
the Willing: "Volunteers," Suicide and Competency, 103 MICH. L. REv. 939 (2005).
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so long as my mother testifies at trial," and thereby wrest control over man-
agement of the trial from his lawyer.
8
1
A capital defendant should no more be able to distort the constitutional-
ly mandated division of decisionmaking power during sentencing than
during trial. The defendant's consent to representation at the beginning of
his trial justifies the lawyer's control over a case's strategic elements.8 9 Once
the defendant has "acquiesced in such representation," he continues to de-
fine the objectives of litigation but cedes control over strategy to his
representative. 9 Deciding the way in which objectives are to be reached is
the essence of strategy. Courts should not allow capital defendants to rede-
fine strategic choices as objectives by qualifying those objectives and
making them dependent on questions of strategy. To do so would be to un-
dermine the Supreme Court's allocation of decisionmaking power and
potentially the very functioning of the adversary system,91 as few decisions
could resist a similar assimilation into more broadly defined goals of litiga-
tion.
In general, courts have not engaged in this analysis because they have
framed the issue differently. They have tended to ask whether a defendant
can waive his right to present mitigating evidence, rather than asking wheth-
er it is his right to control its presentation.9" This focus on waiver, however,
is problematic because it often causes courts to conflate the situations of pro
se and represented defendants. 93 Logically, a pro se defendant controls all
aspects of his case. 94 Meanwhile, a represented defendant necessarily has
less control over his case. Courts should be wary of mistaking the purport-
ed right to control the presentation of mitigating evidence for an extension
88. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988) ("[T]he client must accept
the consequences of the lawyer's [strategic] decision[s]....").
89. Cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
90. See id. at 820-21.
91. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 418 ("The adversary process could not function effectively
if every tactical decision required client approval."); Jones v. Estelle, 722 F2d 159, 165 (5th
Cir. 1983) (en banc), overruled in part by McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) ("The
consequences of the lawyer's decisions fall squarely upon the defendant. There is nothing
untoward in this circumstance. To the contrary, the lawyer as the defendant's representative is
at the core of our adversary process.").
92. See Epstein, supra note 47, at 22-32.
93. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W.3d 510, 560 (Ky. 2004) (citing Faret-
ta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), for the proposition that the defendant "may elect.., to
waive the presentation of mitigating evidence"); State v. Arguelles, 63 P.3d 731, 752-53 (Utah
2003) (drawing on cases involving both represented and unrepresented defendants to conclude
that the defendant can waive the right to present mitigating evidence); see also Epstein, supra
note 47, at 8 ("By citing to Faretta v. California ... the Kentucky decision equated rights-the
right to self-represent with the right to control a case where there is counsel, and both of those
rights with the right to 'plead guilty' to death." (footnote omitted)).
94. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984). As far as waiver is concerned, if
any defendant can waive the right to present mitigating evidence, it is the pro se defendant;
with self-representation comes control of strategic as well as fundamental elements of the
case. See United States v. Davis, 285 F.3d 378, 384-85 (5th Cir. 2002).
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of the right to self-representation. They should disentangle the represented
defendant's distinct situation from that of the pro se defendant and ask
whether control over mitigating evidence is strategic or fundamental.
The Supreme Court has suggested that decisions concerning the investi-
gation of mitigating evidence are best thought of as strategic. 91 In
Strickland, the Court excused a less-than-complete investigation of mitigat-
ing evidence as part of a "strategy choice ... well within the range of
professionally reasonable judgments."96 And in subsequent decisions, the
Court has continued to apply the Strickland standard to cases involving in-
complete investigation of mitigating evidence, asking whether truncated
investigations could be excused as strategic.97 Because decisions about the
investigation of mitigating evidence often implicate the presentation of that
evidence-that is, the decision not to investigate mitigating evidence is also
the decision not to present it-the presentation of mitigating evidence
should also be thought of as strategic. Given the suggestion that the investi-
gation of mitigating evidence is a strategic decision, to read Landrigan as
allocating control over mitigating evidence to criminal defendants would
ultimately work to their detriment. In that scenario, whether counsel or her
client chooses to forgo presenting mitigating evidence, the lost opportunity
to have that evidence heard could elude Strickland safeguards, but on con-
tradictory bases in each case: in one case the mistake would be justified as a
strategic decision, left to counsel, and in the other as a fundamental choice
squarely within the defendant's province.98 It may be to the advantage of
prosecutors to have it both ways, 99 but unreliable, unjust sentences come at a
cost both to defendants and society.
IV. AUTONOMY, RELIABILITY, AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
The characterization of trial decisions as either strategic or fundamental
in current Sixth Amendment jurisprudence militates for counsel's control
95. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984).
96. Id. Strickland made strategic choices based on adequate investigation "virtually
unchallengeable." Id. at 690-91. "By creating this highly deferential standard, the Court in
Strickland implicitly reinforced the validity of the traditional, lawyer-centered approach to
decisionmaking" argued for here. Rodney J. Uphoff, Who Should Control the Decision to Call
a Witness: Respecting a Criminal Defendant's Tactical Choices, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 763, 782
(2000).
97. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
395 (2000); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987). These cases suggest that control over
mitigating evidence involves strategic decisions but also that decisions to forgo further investi-
gation of mitigating evidence must themselves be based upon a good deal of investigation, in
spite of the extremely deferential posture of the Strickland standard.
98. This situation is already apparent to, and exploited by, prosecutors: "On the one
hand, prosecutors call for deference to the failed strategies of trial counsel, where the client
had virtually no understanding or input; and on the other hand, prosecutors claim a defendant
waived the right to argue [ineffective assistance of counsel] when the client himself' made the
decision. Marceau, supra note 77, at 184.
99. Id. at 183-84.
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over the presentation of mitigating evidence. This Part argues that counsel's
control is not only mandated under the law but also makes for good policy.
Section IV.A responds to the argument that allocating control to counsel is
paternalistic and deprives a defendant of his autonomy. Section IV.B con-
tends that assigning control to lawyers will serve both the defendant-by
reducing the likelihood of a death sentence-and the State-by helping en-
sure that any sentence rendered is reliable, individualized, and legitimate.
Finally, Section IV.C acknowledges the worry that attorney control over mit-
igating evidence will sow discord between defendants and attorneys but
suggests that such discord inheres in the nature of the adversary system. The
system's functioning depends on advocates, and an advocate's relationship
with her client depends not on which powers she wields but on how she
wields them.
A. Rebutting the Autonomy Argument
Paternalism is the most persuasive worry one must confront when con-
sidering whether to deny a defendant control over any portion of his case.
Writing for the majority in Faretta, Justice Stewart saw the Court as con-
fronted with "a nearly universal conviction" that forcing counsel on a
defendant violates his right to control his case. 100 To be sure, the Faretta
situation differs markedly from the one examined here-Faretta delineated
a trial right, not a right at sentencing, and a defendant's right to represent
himself reveals nothing about his rights when represented. But the visceral
rejection of paternalism underlying the "nearly universal conviction" identi-
fied by Justice Stewart is the first and most deeply felt argument against
overriding a defendant's evidentiary decisions at sentencing. Indeed, the
Framers themselves were highly suspicious of paternalism, and this distrust
likely informed the first Congress's construction of the Sixth Amendment.0 1
Not only did the Framers distrust the government to act always in the best
interest of the defendant but the very "idea of counsel as master of the de-
fendant's case would have been inconceivable to them."' 12 The first
Congress crafted the Sixth Amendment to provide a defendant with counsel
to assist in his defense, not to wrest control over it from his hands. 03
While the Framers might not have conceived of counsel as master, they
also did not conceive of sentencing or appellate procedure as practiced to-
day-a distinction not lost on the heartiest of originalists. In Martinez v.
Court of Appeal, Justice Scalia emphasized the Framers' suspicion of gov-
ernmental power and argued that they would not have accepted compulsory
assignment of counsel.'1 4 Yet he nevertheless concurred in the Court's
100. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 817 (1975).
101. See Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant's Right to
Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147, 1168 (2010).
102. Id. at 1169.
103. Id. at 1168-69.
104. 528 U.S. 152, 165 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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ruling, reasoning that no constitutional right to self-representation could
exist on appeal, as there exists no constitutional right to appeal in the first
place. 105 For its part, the majority balanced the defendant's autonomy inter-
est-diminished by a guilty verdict-against the government's interest in
fair and efficient judicial proceedings and found that the former could no
longer outweigh the latter.06 Lawyers, then, are forced on unwilling defend-
ants after conviction, and one might contend, at least provisionally, that this
action represents a greater intrusion on a defendant's autonomy than restrict-
ing a convicted, represented defendant's control over one aspect of the
penalty stage of his trial.
Following the Supreme Court's announcement of the right to self-
representation, commentators generally have advocated transferring more
control from defendants to their lawyers, and lower courts have increasingly
done just that. 07 But scholars writing on the specific issue of control over
mitigating evidence have increasingly emphasized a defendant's right to
control his case.0" Richard J. Bonnie argues that the notion that an attorney
should act against her client's wishes so as to avoid the death penalty con-
flicts directly with counsel's traditional duty to respect her client's
autonomy. 19 For Bonnie, because the autonomy interest is "heightened, not
diminished, when choices are made in the shadow of death," the competent
defendant should control the presentation of mitigating evidence. 110 One
might even argue that a defendant's dignity and autonomy interests are
strongest at sentencing, where the stakes are highest and the relevant evi-
dence is most personal. I
Not only do these arguments ignore the legal distinction, discussed in
Part III, between fundamental and strategic decisions but they also give too
much weight to dubious claims about client autonomy, and they undervalue
a defendant's right to a fair trial-the paramount right in our system and one
where the defendant's interests converge with those of the State. For, with-
out a doubt, "the ideal of client autonomy" at times "may conflict with the
client's fight to effective assistance of counsel,"' 2 and this conflict may be
clearest when an attorney and her client disagree about strategy during capi-
tal sentencing. When a defendant asserts his autonomy to preclude the
presentation of mitigating evidence, his autonomy right conflicts with an-
other of his constitutionally guaranteed fights: the fight to a fair trial. In this
scenario, the fight to a fair trial-a fight that "ranks higher" than any
105. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 165.
106. Id. at 162-63 (majority opinion).
107. Hashimoto, supra note 101, at 1148-50.
108. Epstein, supra note 47, at 12-13.
109. Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REv. 1363, 1368
(1988).
110. Id. at 1387, 1391.
111. Ho, supra note 47, at 747-48.
112. Marceau, supra note 77, at 208.
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other' I3-must prevail, and the defendant's autonomy right must yield to the
integrity of the system."14
As for the judges and commentators who ask not whether a defendant
properly controls the presentation of mitigating evidence but whether he can
waive the right completely, the notion of a mitigation waiver, properly con-
sidered, is paradoxical. Our criminal justice system is predicated on the
assumption that people are autonomous actors-that they have, and can ex-
ercise, free will-and thus are responsible for their actions. "5 Advocates use
mitigating evidence to belie this assumption and thereby demonstrate that a
defendant does not deserve the full weight of the law's punishment." 16 It
would be strange and illogical to claim to protect a defendant's autonomy by
allowing him to suppress evidence of his lack of autonomy.' '
The jurisprudential view of a defendant's autonomy at sentencing not-
withstanding, doubts will assuredly linger about his autonomy in a
philosophical sense. But a philosophical condemnation of paternalism
does not withstand scrutiny. On the one hand, a represented defendant has
already compromised his autonomy by the fact of his representation." 8 On
the other, even the staunchest advocates of a criminal defendant's right to
control his case concede that the government can legitimately impinge on
113. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984). For a discussion of
how the "public trial analog ... confirms that interests of society may preclude defendant
waivers," see Epstein, supra note 47, at 27-28.
114. E.g., Carter, supra note 52, at 109 ("[E]ven in the context of the hallowed right to
self-representation, the systemic interest in just proceedings prevails over the individual
right."); see, e.g., Casey, supra note 54, at 94-95 ("A defendant cannot give the state permis-
sion to impose a punishment that would otherwise violate the Eighth Amendment."); Epstein,
supra note 47, at 25-30 (arguing that the Eighth Amendment requires mitigating evidence be
heard in all cases); see also Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176-78 (2008) (holding that
courts may force a lawyer on a defendant found competent to stand trial but not competent to
conduct it, in part to further "the most basic of the Constitution's criminal law objectives,
providing a fair trial").
115. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment forbids the execution of the "mentally retarded," in part because cognitive and
behavioral impairments make such individuals less than fully autonomous and therefore less
culpable).
116. Ho, supra note 47, at 748 ("[M]any forms of mitigating evidence can be under-
stood, in a broad sense, as evidence that tends to show that a defendant is not autonomous.");
see also Melody Dickson, Comment, Dismantling the Free Will Fairytale: The Importance of
Demonstrating the Inability to Overcome in Death Penalty Narratives, 77 UMKC L. REv.
1123, 1130 (2009) ("[Mitigating] evidence 'challenges jurors' perceptions about the choices
available to the defendant and explains why his 'choice' to commit a crime may really have
been no choice at all.'" (quoting Francine Banner, Rewriting History: The Use of Feminist
Narratives to Deconstruct the Myth of the Capital Defendant, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 569,585 (2001))).
117. See Ho, supra note 47, at 748. See generally Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of
Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 621, 650 (2005) (arguing that, in the context of a crim-
inal trial, the idea of individual autonomy makes no sense).
118. Hashimoto, supra note 101, at 1179 ("One could argue ... that defendants waive
any autonomy interest they might have by accepting assistance of counsel.").
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a defendant's autonomy once a court finds him guilty.19 As a result, the
State's interest proves heftier at sentencing, and the government can legiti-
mately impinge on a defendant's autonomy. Thanks to the bifurcation of
capital trials, sentencing takes place after a court has found a defendant
guilty, and the considerations that make a defendant's autonomy interest
nearly absolute during the guilt stage no longer apply. 2 ° A defendant and his
counsel are also more likely to agree on the best possible result of litigation
once conviction reduces potential outcomes to two: life without parole or
death. 2 '
Furthermore, depriving a defendant of his autonomy is less of an affront
to his dignity than it might seem, since the use of mitigating evidence is in-
tended to ensure that the judicial process respects the dignity of the
defendant by producing an individualized and reliable sentence in conformi-
ty with the Eighth Amendment. 22 Denying a criminal defendant the full
exercise of his autonomy at sentencing may infringe on his dignity, but sure-
ly less so than putting him to death without hearing mitigating evidence that,
if ultimately unable to save his life, would at least ensure that he was treated
and considered as an individual. It is difficult to defend coherently the
stance that would have courts protect a defendant's dignity only to lay great-
er indignities on him.
Some have argued that "autonomy" is little more than a "rhetorical
flourish," bandied about by prosecutors to the clear detriment of defend-
ants. 23 Many have questioned whether courts should consider a criminal
defendant's autonomy interests at any point during his encounter with the
criminal justice system, since doing so is more likely to hurt than to help the
defendant.24 Defenders of autonomy counter that (1) no empirical evidence
119. Id. at 1170; see also Ho, supra note 47, at 745 ("[1It is hard to think that any person
who has just been convicted of a capital offense and is faced with two options-life impris-
onment or death-is 'autonomous'... ").
120. Compare Hashimoto, supra note 101, at 1148 (arguing that because the guilt phase
precedes a guilty verdict, the government cannot legitimately curtail a defendant's autonomy
there), with Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000) (noting that "the autonomy
interests that survive a felony conviction are less compelling than" a defendant's autonomy
interests at trial).
121. Lawyers and defendants have different considerations, and the defendant and his
lawyer might disagree about which risks are worth taking or about how to define the "best
possible result" of litigation. See Hashimoto, supra note 101, at 1178. For example, a defend-
ant may find any possibility of acquittal, however remote, more valuable than a sentence
discount, or even more valuable than the difference between a life and death sentence. See id.
To be sure, it is the defendant who will suffer from the exposure of painful or embarrassing
mitigating evidence, and thus he may calculate its value vis-A-vis the risk of receiving the
death penalty differently than counsel. See, e.g., Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1230-
31 (10th Cir. 2001).
122. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 47, at 741.
123. Daniel R. Williams, Mitigation and the Capital Defendant Who Wants to Die: A
Study in the Rhetoric of Autonomy and the Hidden Discourse of Collective Responsibility, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 693, 698 (2006).
124. Hashimoto, supra note 101, at 1176.
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supports the claim that represented defendants fare better than defendants
who make their own decisions, (2) the Court's jurisprudence allocates at
least some decisions to defendants' control, and (3) defendants and their
attorneys often define "best possible outcome" differently.
125
In the case of capital sentencing, the special circumstances of the pro-
ceedings resolve the debate. 26 First, mitigating evidence is frequently a
defendant's best hope for life, and empirical studies have shown its influ-
ence on jury determinations. 27 Second, as I have demonstrated, because
decisions concerning mitigating evidence are best characterized as strategic
and thus are of the type typically controlled by counsel, the Court's juris-
prudence supports allocating such decisions to attorneys. Finally, a
defendant who has set life as the goal of litigation agrees with his attorney
that the best possible outcome of his trial is to not be put to death by the
State. 
1 28
B. Reliable, Individualized Sentences
Once one has addressed these typical objections to curtailing a client's
putative autonomy, the advantages of attorney control are clear and unquali-
fied. Mitigating evidence is the best means by which to achieve both the
client's goals-life without parole-and the goals of the State-a nonarbi-
trary, reliable, individualized, and legitimate sentence. 29 And the realization
of both goals depends not just on the existence of mitigating evidence but
also on its presentation by counsel. 3
In the aggregate, more lawyer control would likely mean that juries and
judges hear more-and, crucially, better-presented-mitigating evidence. This
is because cases of disagreement between counsel and client would more
likely see counsel advocating for the presentation of evidence and the client
hoping to suppress it. For defendants, the frequently intimate nature of
125. Id. at 1176-79.
126. See Epstein, supra note 47, at 10 (questioning "how securing a sentence of life
imprisonment, rather than death, could ever be an act that 'harms the client' "); Hashimoto,
supra note 101, at 1176 ("The combination of the threatened death penalty and the fact that
the defendant appears to be making a very unwise decision by foregoing the presentation of
mitigating evidence has led some to question why the defendant's autonomy should be con-
sidered at all.") (citing Casey, supra note 54, at 104-05, and Williams, supra note 123, at 698).
127. Ineffective Assistance, supra note 15, at 263 (citing Michelle E. Barnett et al., When
Mitigation Evidence Makes a Difference: Effects of Psychological Mitigating Evidence on
Sentencing Decisions in Capital Trials, 22 BEHAV. SCl. & L. 751, 746-66 (2004)).
128. See supra note 121.
129. See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 260 (2007); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 605 (1978); see also Epstein, supra note 47, at 21 ("[Lockett's] core notion that
death-worthiness cannot be assessed without considering mitigating factors remains vital.").
130. A presentencing report, for example, is less effective than attorney-presented miti-
gating evidence, since it "may include highly detrimental (or poorly explained or
contextualized) information" and because it "divorces mitigation from the trial context, rather
than structuring the presentation in light of the nature of the crime and the conduct of the
accused." Epstein, supra note 47, at 34.
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mitigating evidence causes many to object to some if not all of it. 131 As for
lawyers, Supreme Court precedent pressures lawyers to err on the side of
investigating and presenting mitigating evidence or risk the embarrassment
of future claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 1
32
Certainly, some cases will arise in which the defendant insists on the
sentencer hearing information that his lawyer believes or knows is time-
consuming or irrelevant or distracting or, worse, has been shown to cause
juries to think less of defendants. In such cases, if the lawyer is correct, so-
ciety and the defendant will benefit from her superior strategy. If, however,
she is mistaken and forgoes the presentation of potentially helpful mitigat-
ing evidence in the face of her client's objections, her client will have
recourse to already-existing procedures for claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. 33
Promoting the presentation of mitigating evidence is desirable because
mitigating evidence greatly reduces the likelihood that a sentencer will im-
pose the death penalty, while it simultaneously helps to ensure the reliability
of whichever decision the sentencer ultimately reaches. Whether effective or
not, mitigating evidence offers a convicted capital defendant his only oppor-
tunity to make his case for life to his sentencer. 134 And mitigating evidence
is, in fact, effective.1 35 Defendants who exercise their right to present miti-
gating evidence fare better than those who do not-so much so that some
have argued that the death penalty becomes "inevitable" without it.
136
Mitigating evidence does more than save lives. Through the presentation
of mitigating evidence, the criminal justice system can realize its basic un-
derlying premise. Our system is based on the assumption that truth emerges
from the crucible of adversarial testing. 37 The Constitution requires "access
to counsel's skill and knowledge"-that is, the right to counsel--during cap-
ital sentencing because the adversarial system fails without it. 3 Counsel's
role, during both the guilt and penalty phases of a capital trial, is "to ensure
that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result."13 9 Our
concem for just results should nowhere be higher than where one of two
possible results is death.
When no one argues the case for life, a jury is not only less likely to
spare the defendant's life but is also less likely to produce a reliable result.40
131. See supra note 15.
132. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377, 381-93 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510, 523-34 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-98 (2000); id. at 398-99
(plurality opinion).
133. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 377, 383.
134. Marceau, supra note 77, at 186-87.
135. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 47, at 741.
136. Id. at 740.
137. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 686-87.
140. Casey, supra note 54, at 77 n.9.
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Courts and the State need the opportunity to consider an argument for miti-
gation in order to be sure that the sentence imposed is appropriate for the
particular defendant. 141 The advocate brings to the case the emotional de-
tachment needed to make clearheaded decisions as to strategy and the
expertise needed to present the evidence effectively, 42 highlighting infor-
mation known to affect juries favorably and downplaying or excluding
harmful or unhelpful facts. 143 Counsel organizes the evidence into a narra-
tive that at once enlivens the facts and contextualizes the crime, mitigating
the defendant's culpability to the extent possiblea"-all the while serving
the interests of both the State and the accused.
C. A Final Objection
Logic, the Court's jurisprudence, and a proper consideration of a de-
fendant's autonomy may support counsel's control over mitigating evidence,
but a final worry persists: Having reached an impasse with his lawyer, will
an unhappy client not simply fire his attorney and proceed pro se? Is this
result not more damaging than even the lost opportunity to present mitigat-
ing evidence?
45
Practically speaking, a trial court is unlikely to allow a defendant to
dismiss his attorney when a conflict arises over the introduction of mitigat-
ing evidence. 46 Should this prove not to be the case, however, the argument
for attorney control remains strong. The danger that a defendant and his
counsel will find themselves unable to reach a consensus on matters of trial
strategy is no doubt a great one. But it is a danger that plagues every stage
of the criminal process and a problem that goes beyond the question of how
the law allocates decisionmaking authority. As with questions of strategy
during the guilt phase of a trial, counsel has a moral and a professional duty
to do her best to develop a strategy that will not only achieve the best possi-
ble outcome for her client but will also be one with which her client is
comfortable."' Obstinate clients and obdurate lawyers will always exist, but
141. Id. at 97.
142. Marceau, supra note 77, at 188.
143. See Epstein, supra note 47, at 34 (describing how the absence of counsel in the pre-
sentencing report process can allow the presentation of "highly detrimental (or poorly ex-
plained or contextualized) information" and prevent the defendant from "structuring the
presentation in light of the nature of the crime and the conduct of the accused").
144. Id.
145. See Casey, supra note 54, at 90.
146. Hashimoto, supra note 101, at 1156 ("[M]any lower courts have held that defend-
ants waive their right of self-representation if they do not invoke the right prior to the start of
the trial.").
147. See Uphoff, supra note 96, at 798-834 (arguing that counsel should weigh four
factors to decide whether to respect a client's strategic choice: (1) defendant's capacity, (2)
defendant's reasons, (3) harm facing the defendant, and (4) likelihood defendant will suffer
that harm if counsel respects his choice).
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their existence says nothing about the appropriate allocation of deci-
sionmaking authority at any part of the trial.
CONCLUSION
Counsel should control the presentation of mitigating evidence during
capital sentencing. Despite the personal nature of many forms of mitigating
evidence, decisions concerning its presentation-including whether to pre-
sent it, how much to present, and how to present it-are best characterized
as strategic. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel allocates strategic deci-
sions to attorneys, and although many Sixth Amendment rights wither or fall
away completely at sentencing, the right to counsel retains all its vitality. A
defendant's claims to autonomy, however, do not. While a guilty verdict
reduces a defendant's autonomy, the criminal justice system's need for reli-
able and legitimate sentences remains the same. Mitigating evidence
benefits from a lawyer's skill and training, and well-presented mitigating
evidence helps promote reliability and legitimacy. Courts should not allow
dubious claims about autonomy to suppress evidence that undermines the
very autonomy a defendant seeks to exercise, especially since the defend-
ant's exercise of autonomy will likely result in death.
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